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THE FRENCH LAW OF COLLECTIVTE

LABOR AGREEMENTS
RALPH F. FUCHS0
THE reported decisions of the French courts in cases involving
collective labor agreements1 display a unique handling of this

modern industrial phenomenon. Even prior to the Act of March
25,

1919,2

which prescribed the legal treatment of such agree-

ments, the cases reveal a fairly consistent, logical theory of their
nature and effects. There were no such chaos and uncertainty as
prevail in this country.3 On the other hand, even the Act of 1919
has not accorded collective agreements a central place in industrial control such as they have occupied in Germany since 1918. 4
They have simply been given a fair field in which to operate in
the fixing of wages and working conditions. The courts have
stood ready to enforce their provisions wherever the affected
individuals have not manifested dissent; but the formal privilege
of individuals to escape from their control and to determine employment conditions by individual contract has been safeguarded
by courts and legislature alike.
It is largely in petty litigation that the legal enforcement of
collective labor agreements is sought and resisted in the courts
of France. In a suit for wages the plaintiff may seek to collect
according to the scale which has been incorporated into a collec* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.
'A collective labor agreement may be concluded under varying circumstances, depending upon the number of employers and workers involved
and the manner of their organization and representation. There may be
only a single employer and an informal group of workers, or there may be
one or more legally-constituted associations on each side. The agreement
which they make may be designed to fhx wages and wordng conditions, to
provide an established method of settling future differences between employers and employees, or both. Compare Hamilton, Collcetive Barganing
(1930) 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 628. The same writer's
article on Collectivism, id. at 633, discusses the general antithesis between
that theory and individualism, one aspect of which is illustrated by the
problem discussed in the following pages. The writer is also indebted to an

article by Ga~tan Pirou, The Theary of the Collectire Labor Contract in
France (1922) 5 INT. LAB. Rnv. 35, in which many of the points herein
treated are suggested.
2 Code du travail (Labor Code), bk. I, §§ 31, 31a-3Lx, 32.
3 Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in Azcrican. Law (1931) 44 HLuw.
L. REv. 572; Fuchs, Collective Labor Agrecn nts in A-crican Law (1924)
10 ST. Louis L. REV. 1.
4Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in German Law (1929) 15 ST.
Louis L. REv. 1.
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tive agreement.5 Again a few francs damages may be sought on
account of the plaintiff's summary discharge by the defendant
in the face of a collective agreement which was supposed to
assure a week's notice. Frequently a union files an action for
damages alleged to have been caused to the organization or its
members by an employer's violation of a collective agreement.,
Occasionally an employer sues a union on account of its alleged
breach of agreement in calling a strike.8 But usually the amounts
sought are small; and the judgments rendered frequently are
little more than judicial slaps on the wrist. Rarely are the courts
called upon, as in Germany," to determine controversies involving
important matters of industrial statecraft."l
No doubt the pettiness of French collective agreement litigation is partly the result of the limited scope and unstable character of French labor organization. French unionism from the
beginning, as represented by the national federations, has been
revolutionary in nature and divided against itself along doctrinal
lines. Its central organizations have been indisposed to foster
such instruments of compromise with capitalism as collective
agreements.1 Employers thus have been strengthened in their
reluctance to deal with the unions, and the government has not
seen fit to permit the labor organizations to share in controlling
employment relations nearly as fully as in Germany. 12 Moreover,
French workers themselves have not been bound to the unions
by firm ties. Dues have been small and delinquencies in their payment the rule rather than the exception." The prevailing form
of organization appears to be that of local craft unions joined
into regional unions along industrial lines.14 These, finally, are
federated nationally. 15 Membership in the principal federated
5 Seine, Cons. de Prud'hommes, Nov. 13, 1920, infra note 100.
6 Cour de Cassation, Chambre Civile (hereinafter cited Cass. Civ.), Jan,
15, 1918, DALLOZ, RECEUIL PgRIODIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCV, (hereinafter cited

D.) (1918) part I, at 17.
7 Cass. Civ. Jun. 18, 1923, D. 1927, I, 87.
8 Chamb6ry Oct. 4, 1910, infra note 74.
9 Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 7, 15, 17-18, 20-21, 39-40.
10 But see Cour de Cassation, Chambre des Requites (hereinafter cited
Cass. Req.), Jan. 25, 1905, infra note 42; Lyon, Mar. 10, 1908, infra note
106.
11 MARJORIE RUTH CLARK, A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH LABOR MOVEMENT
(1910-1928) (1930) gives an account of the history and attitudes of French
unionism. French employers' organization is much more complete but is
lacking in unity. Its central organization is merely a coordinating body;
and French employers have not yet accepted the principle of collective bargaining with labor unions. See Employers' Organizations in Franco (1927)
16 INT. LAB. Rzv. 50.
12 Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 10, 38-39.
13 CLARK, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 27, 28.
14 Id. at 29
15 Since 1921, following nearly twenty years of formal union in one or-
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unions has fluctuated widely.'0 In 1927 it was claimed to be
1,118,2567 out of a total working population in commerce and
industry except agriculture of 8,000,000.13 Only recently has
there been a strong tendency toward stable, responsible
unionism. 19
In collective bargaining the local and regional unions are the
chief negotiating and contracting units.21, A considerable proportion of collective labor agreements, however, continues to be made
by temporary, informal associations or committees of workers
whose authority seldom comprises more than a very small area.2 1
-The subject matter of most collective agreements, furthermore,
although it is becoming somewhat broaderi has on the whole
been quite limited..23 It is, therefore, with relatively small conganization, there have been two important national confederations of labor
in France: the older, more conservative Conf~dratiou Gemnral du Travail
(C. G. T.) and the Co ffddratian Gg n&al du Travailunitaire (C. G. T. U.),
the latter of which is affiliated with the Third, or communist, International.
Id. at 110-111.
16 Statistics of French union membership are exceedingly unreliable. The
Minister of Labor reported 1,181,297 industrial and commercial and 1,583,247 agricultural unionists, federated and unfederated, as of Jan. 1, 192G.
BULL.MIN. Du TRAY. (1928) at 420, 423. The corresponding figures for the
year preceding, based upon corrections in the figures for Jan. 1, 1920, were,
respectively, 1,846,047 and 1,222,534. Id. (1925) at 289. The foregoing
figures include only the membership of unions registered under the Act
of March 21, 1884, although unregistered unions have been legal since the
Act of July 1, 1901, § 2, BULL. DES LOIS, v. 382, at 1273. It is impossible to
determine what proportion of the total number of unionists belongs to the
confederated unions, the value of whose own estimates is discussed in the
following footnote.
17 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 122, 143. These estimates, which are
for the C. G. T. and the C. G. T. U., are notoriously exaggerated. Onehalf the cited figure probably would be nearer to the truth. Id. at 121-122.
There is also a Christian union movement which claimed a membership of
120,000 in 1925. INT. LAB. OFF., FREDoM OF ASSOCIATION, v. II (Studies
and Reports, Ser. A, No. 29) at 115.
IsTardy, Le v~glerment amiable des conflits collcctifs de travail (1929)
138 REv. PoL. ET PARL. 445.
19 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, cc. VIII, IX. At the same time the C. G.
T. U. has grown until now it seems to be equal to the C. G. T. in strength.
Tardy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 443.
2
OUALIm ET PICQUENARD, SALAIRES ET TARIFS, 277-279. There have been
a few agreements on a national scale, formed under the impetus given to
collective bargaining by war-time and immediate post-war conditions. Id.
at 492.
21 The exact proportion of such agreements is not determinable. The
BULLETIN DU MINISTRn Du TRAVAi gives annual figures of collective labor
agreements reported to the Minister of Labor, which are by no means all
that actually are concluded. In 1927 and 1928, out of 157 agreemcnts so
reported, only 100 were stated to have been entered into by permanent
unions.
2
. 2UALD Lr PICQUENARD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 495 et seq.
23 Before the war the collective agreement "was limited, in general, to
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troversies that these agreements have busied the courts.
The importance to Americans of the French judicial treatment
of collective labor agreements is, however, not lessened by the
comparative pettiness of the controversies. Not only is unionism
in the United States possibly as weak as in France, although for
quite different reasons, but identical principles of law and politics
have restrained the growth of collective control in both countries.
If in France, therefore, a well-defined though subordinate place
has been accorded to collective agreements in controlling employment relations, and if French students of law and of labor recognize in them an essential basis of future development, the significance for the United States of the relevant French law is
increased rather than diminished.
L Individualism v. Collectivism
In France as in the United States the doctrine of the freedom of
the individual has formed the core of a great part of constitutional law. 24 In the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789
it was proclaimed:
"The purpose of all political association is the preservation of
the natural and inalienable rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.... Liberty
consists in being able to do all that does not injure another; hence
the existence of the natural rights of each individual has no
limits except such as assure to the other members of society the
enjoyment of these same rights... ,y25
Nor was individual freedom to be safeguarded only against opregistering the narrow and temporary agreement upon the points which
had given rise to the difference [settled by the agreement], leaving in
obscurity all the other clauses capable of constituting a local, regional, or
general law of the trade. It contained scarcely any provisions designed to
avoid conflicts by prescribing in advance a procedure of conciliation or
arbitration." Id. at 278.
24 It will be appreciated, of course, that the French courts have no power
to declare legislation invalid because it is in conflict with the constitution.
Lambert, Pic, and Garraud, The Sources and the Interpretation of Labour
Law in France (1926) 14 INT. LAB. REv. 19. Nevertheless the accepted
views of constitutional law are a powerful influence upon legislators and
serve as guides to the courts in their interpretation of statutes. They have
an even more inviolate sanctity in the eyes of those whose economic interests they serve.
25 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF IMAN (1789) art. I. §§ 2, 4. This declaration and that of 1793, which are regarded as the cornerstones of French
constitutional law, are not formally written into or recognized by the stillexisting Constitution of 1875; but they are looked upon as controlling.
(8th ed. 1927) 599; 3
UMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL
ESMEIN,
DUGUIT, TRAITt DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (3d ed. 1930) 605-611; Bonnecase, note in SIRNY, RECUEIL G15N9RAL DES LOIS ET DES ARRfTS (hereinafter
cited S.), 1920, part I, at 17-20.
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pression by the state. It must be protected also from infringement by associations of all kinds, which were considered to be
prone to tyrannize over members and non-members and even to
challenge the authority of the state itself. It followed logically
that to afford the greatest possible protection against usurpers
of this sort their existence must be prohibited entirely. Hence
economic associations were forbidden by legislation in 1791,21 and
other associations in 1834.-2 Thus the individual and the state
became the only legally recognized entities for controlling employment relations. The one exercised his control by making
contracts; the other might legislate if it saw fit.2 8 Their exclusive r6gime endured for over three-quarters of a century.2
When in 1884, after a long struggle, the legality of trade
associations and unions of employers and employees was established,2 0 the legislature was in theory effecting an extension of
individual freedom. Whatever may have been the intention of
those who for years had been defying the law in order to escape
from the inadequacy of the individual labor contract, 31 the new
Act was proposed in order to enable the individual to express
himself more fully than before by joining with others in economic
organizations. It was not to be thought of, therefore, that these
organizations should be permitted to exercise coercive power or
authority of any sort. It is fundamental, said the ministerial
sponsor of the Act, that "The right of a worker who does not
want to become party to an association is equal to the right of
10,000 workers who wish to make him a party." 32 Consequently,
although the offense of attempting "to restrict the free exercise
of labor and industry by means of fines, prohibitions, proscriptions, and combined interdictions" 23 was abolished,31 it remains
an offense, punishable by imprisonment of six days to three years
and/or a fine of sixteen to 3000 francs, "by means of violence,
26 BRETHE, DE LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DE LA CONVENTION COLLECTIVE DE
(1921) 1; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, op. cit. s pra note 17,

TRAVAM

at 88.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, op.

2

cit.

svpra note 17, at 91.

LeChapelier, the author of the Act of 1791, gave it as his view that
"free agreements between individual and individual must fix the day's work
for each worker." Id. at 89. Duguit, interpreting the ideas of the legislature of 1791, states the matter thus: "Man is not truly free unless he
remains isolated and independent, placed at once under the protection and
the exclusive power of the state." Op. cit. supra note 25, v. 5, at 183.
28

29

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, op. cit. szvpra note 17, at 87.

3

0By § 2 of the Act of Mar. 21, 1884, now incorporated in LABOR CODE,

bk. 3, § 2.
31 INTERNATIoNAL LABOUR OFFICE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 93-99.
32Waldeck-Rousseau, quoted in MORIN, LA RIVOLTE DES FAITS C0.NTIS
CODE (1920) 35.
33 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, op. cit. s2upra note 17, at 97.
- ACT of Mar. 21, 1884, § 1. BULL. DES LOIS, V. 313, at 617.
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assaults, intimidation, or fraudulent action to bring about or
maintain or attempt to bring about or maintain a concerted cessation of work for the purpose of forcing the raising or lowering
of wages or of infringing upon the free exercise of labor or industry." 35 Moreover, an extensive body of law relating to "abuse of
right" has been constructed upon two sections of the Civil Code."
Hence strikes, lockouts, blacklists, picketing, and the like, which
are made legal by the Act of 1884, 37 may, if they cause injury,
become torts. They cannot always be torts even when they cause
damage, since they have been legalized. Hence they are hold to
be wrongful when engaged in for improper purposes. The courts,
of course, pass upon the legitimacy of the purposes of concerted
action.38 The sole guide for their decisions, except such as they
have chosen to set up for themselves, has been the statutory
definition of the object of trade associations and unions as the
study and furtherance of economic interests.38
Individual employers and workers in France, therefore, remain
free to govern their relations to each other by any sort of contract they choose. Other employers and workers are free to form
associations and unions and to engage in concerted activity for
the purposes sanctioned in the statute. If this concerted activity
injures a non-union worker by bringing about his discharge, or
an employer by driving away prospective customers, it is a question for litigation whether the association is guilty of "abuse of
right" or whether the victim has suffered damnum absquc injuria. A demonstrated improper motive may determine the question against the association."0 In its absence, the court which has
35 PENAL CODE, § 414. Criminal statutes of general application prohibit
violence and intimidation, but the punishments prescribed are less drastic
and the definition of intimidation is more narrowly restricted than in the
section quoted. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 'Op. cit. suprat note 17, at
171-175.
31 §§ 1382, 1383. "Any act whatsoever of an individual which causes injury to another obliges the party responsible for its occurrence to make
reparation." "Everyone is responsible for damage which he has caused,
not only by his willful act, but also by his negligence or imprudence."
37 LABOR CODE, bk. 3, § 1: "Trade associations shall have as their solo
object the study and furtherance of economic, industrial, commercial, and
agricultural interests." § 24 authorizes the associations to act together for
the same purposes.
38 The history of the doctrine of "abus de droit" and analyses of its
results in various fields of litigation are contained in notes by G. Appert
and E. Naquet, appended to the reports of decisions in S. 1904, II, 217, and
S. 1912, II, 97. The identity of the questions thus arising with those which
have troubled Anglo-American courts in tort law, the law of conspiracy

as applied to labor, etc., is obvious. See FRANKFURTER AND GnESNE, TuIs
LABOR INJUNCTION

(1930) 24-46; 7 LABATT, LAw

(1913) §§ 2660-2662.

OF MASTER AND SERVANT

39Supra note 37.
40 Cass. Civ. Mar. 20, 1929, Bull. Cass. Civ. 1929, at 126. The action was
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the point to decide is pulled in one direction by the absolute right
of the individual to contract 1 and in the other by the unqualified
privilege of the association to further the economic interests of
itself and its members. .
The necessity for distinguishing between individual and collective interests has also arisen in the determination of the right
of trade associations to sue in tort. That right was accorded by
the Trade Association Act of 1884.43 In the construction of the
statute the right was, however, limited to the institution of such
suits as contributed to the attainment of the statutory purposes
of such associations. Hence it became necessary in each case to
determine whether the plaintiff actually was attempting to vindicate an "economic interest" which it was its mission to "study
and further." - Furthermore the collective interest of an association was distinguished from the individual interests of its members, and it was held that only the protection of the former
might be made the object of a suit by the association. It was
recognized that a collective interest might be damaged by injuries to individual interests, as in cases of wage cutting or of
discharges of union members. An effort was made, however, to
distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" injuries of this sort.
Only the former might be redressed in actions by the association.
After nearly thirty years of conflicting decisions, some of which
were more liberal than others in recognizing collective interests
and direct injuries to them,1 the liberal trend definitely prevailed
in 1913 through a decision of the united chambers of the Court
against an employer for wrongful discharge. It was held that the lower
court should have admitted testimony in behalf of the plaintiff that the
defendant's sole reason for discharging him was his membership in a union.
The principle is the same as in actions against associations. See case cited
infra note 41.
41 Cass. Civ. Jun. 22, 1892, S. 1893, I, 41.
-Cass. Req. Jan. 25, 1905, D. 1905, I, 153, S. 1906, I, 209, in which the
purpose of the defendant union in continuing to carry on a strike was to
force the plaintiff to enter into a collective agreement which provided for
conciliation of future disputes.
43 § 6, BULL. DES LOIS, v. 313, at 618.
4

Supra note 37.

45 The decisions of the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation were
especially conservative in cases of intervention by associations in criminal
prosecutions under §§ 63-70 of the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Code
d'instructien criminelle) for the purpose of collecting damages from traders
or employers who were guilty of illegal practices. The civil chambers, on
the other hand, were inclined to be more liberal in the ordinary civil actions
which came before them. The various lower courts were similarly divided.
It was suggested that some of the conffict might be explained by recognizing
that an association might sue to prevent injuries for which it could not
afterward collect damages. See the note of Al. Henri Capitant, D. 1909,
II, 34, in which the distinction is criticized. The earlier cases are reviewed
in the report of M. le conseiller Falcimaigne to the Court in the case next
cited.
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of Cassation. 4r The case involved an intervention by the National
Association for the Protection of French Wine Culture in a prosecution 47 of a merchant who had diluted wine with water. The
Rouen Court of Appeals awarded 2000 francs damages to the
intervenor on account of the injury to the reputation of French
wine and of the tendency to lower prices which resulted from
the defendant's fraud. The criminal chamber of the Court of
Cassation having reversed and remanded the case, the court of
appeals persisted in its judgment. It was sustained on the second
48
appeal.
The tendency which prevailed in the foregoing decision was
strengthened by the Act of March 12, 1920, supplementing the
Act of 1884, in which it was provided that trade associations
and unions might sue on account of "acts causing a direct or
indirect injury to the collective interest of the trade which they
represent." 49 Even the criminal chamber has now gone far in
recognizing collective interests and direct injuries to them. Thus
a national federation of building workers has been held to be
entitled to institute a prosecution and to endeavor to collect damages from a contractor with the goyernment during the war,
upon the ground that he had reflected upon the collective patriotism of the building workers by representing to the government
that he was paying them higher wages than they were receiving
or had demanded.- Similarly, an employer who violates the
weekly day-of-rest statute may have to answer not only to the
government but also to a labor union on account of the added
trouble to which the union is put in defending its members'
rights..
In discussing the foregoing classes of cases French theorists
have not been content to argue simply with regard to the usefulness of tort actions by associations in the enforcement of the
law governing business conduct. It has, it is true, been recognized
as a practical matter that if there is to be a civil action against
a merchant who adulterates his product, a single competitor can
scarcely show sufficient direct injury to entitle him to bring it
It has also been pointed out that individual workers are not likely
4G6
Cass.

R6un. Apr. 5, 1913, D. 1914, I, 65, S. 1920, I, 49.
47 See supra note 45.
4S Perroud, The Organization of the Courts and the Judicial Bcnch in
France (1929) 11 J. Comep. LEGIS. (3d ser.) 10-11, contains a good account
of the appellate procedure involved in this case.
49
LABOR CODE, bk. 3, § 11. The same Act extended similar powers to
federations of associations, which theretofore had not enjoyed the right to
sue. Id. bk. 3, §§ 24, 26.
50 Cass. 'Crim. Jun. 8, 1923, D. 1923, I, 201.
51 Cass. Crim. Mar. 14, 1924, DALLOZ, RECUEIL H
IIDOIADAIRE D&JUItsPRUDENCE (hereinafter cited D. H.) (1924) 263. The court below had
awarded 200 francs damages.
52 Note of M. Achille Mestre, S. 1920, I, 49.
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to incur the disfavor of employers by suing them for infractions
of the law and that such violations must be redressed by the
unions if civil remedies are to be invoked at all., 3 But advocates
of a broad right of associations to sue have, in addition, argued
upon the basis of a "collective personality," a metaphysical entity
whose existence, interests, and powers are entitled to judicial
recognition.5 It has been contended on the other side that such
an entity does not exist; that there is no collective interest which
is different from the sum of the interests of individuals; and that
hence, except as regards suits over their property, associations
should not be permitted to sue unless the members individually
have that right.55 Thus the solution of a specific practical problem has been regarded as a phase of a larger battle between two
abstractions. Victory for the collectivist side was hailed with
considerable felwor56
II.

Theories of Collective Agreements

French theories of the legal nature of collective labor agreements
can only be understood in relation to the clash between individualistic and collectivistic views of the control of employment relations. To some writers, these relations must be explained in
M. Capitant, supra note 45.
54 In the report to the Court of Cassation, sue pra note 45, the purpose of
the French parliament in enacting the Act of 1884 was interpreted to have
been "to re-establish the corporate association, . . . of which one of the
consequences was this: between the interest of society in general, the protection of which continued to be in sole charge of the public minister, and
the interest of the individual, the defense of which belongs to each citizen,
the law recognized the eistence on an intermediate plane of a new general
interest, less extensive than the former, more ex\tensive than the latter, and
which is the general or collective interest of a given profession viewed as
a whole and considered as an abstraction from the persons who compose
it. To this new interest the law has given an agency of protection, which
is the association, an intangible being separate from the physical persons
who create it by their union. . . . The collective interest . . . is one and
indivisible, it appertains to the trade as personified in the association... 1'
55 Al. 3. A. Roux in a note in S. 1908, I, 107, while admitting that it is
possible to conceive of entrusting the defense of the reputation of a trade
to an association, insists that under the Acr OF 1884, "In uniting and in
associating, merchants, industrialists, or agriculturalists are only able to
unite what they possess themselves, by way of rights as of property, and
the individual right remains the substratum which is necessary for the
action instituted by an association. That is to say, the right of action of an
association, admissible where an individual right exists as against unfair
competition, ceases when this individual right is lacking."
ZG"With authority, with accuracy, with deliberation [thee decisions]
53 Note by

...affirm the reality of the collective personality....

This view . . .

constitutes the judicial recognition of an undoubted social fact.... One
may say that with these decisions the theory, too long dominant, of the
fiction of intangible persons, the purely individualistic doctrine of corporate
law,

. .

. has at last succumbed." Blestre, op. cit. supra note 52.

1014

YALE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. dl

terms of workers personally arranging their labor contractssometimes through the device of unions and associations, but still
without a higher authority than the individual. To other writers
it is simply rank traditionalism which refuses to recognize labor
unions and employers' associations as agencies of industrial government with power to make agreements which shall constitute
law for individual workers and employers. Formally, the individualistic view continues to dominate legislation and judicial
decision. Concessions have, however, been made which cause the
other theory to express more nearly the actual state of affairs in
those situations in which collective agreements are the product
of strong labor and employer organizations.
The individualistic theory of collective agreements has taken
a number of forms. 5 7 In the first place it has been contended that
a collective agreement is a contract made by the individual workers and employers who are members of the groups which conclude it. They become parties to the agreement by representation. 8 Just how they are represented and by whom depends upon
the particular writer's views of the legal nature of groups and
associations and upon the kind of groups involved in the specific
case. Behind the collective agreement and equally as important
as that agreement itself lie the express or implied agreements
by which the groups have been constituted. In any event, if in a
given instance a collective agreement has been formed at all,
either the association or the negotiators for it are thought to
have contracted on behalf of the members. Hence rights and
duties attach to these members as fully as if they had contracted
for themselves.59 It is scarcely necessary to point out that these
rights and duties ordinarily are not identical with those that
57 It does not seem to have been seriously denied in France, as it has In
the United States (Rice; Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 3) that collective labor
agreements have legal force. PLANIOL, TRAlT]L 1IMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL,
is quoted by Capitant, note in D. 1909, II, 35, as denying that such agreements have legal sanction. In the seventh edition (1917) of the same work,
however, while stating that a collective agreement is only a "declaration"
by the employer, M. Planiol admits that it is a matter of discussion whether
legal rights and duties flow from it. Vol. 2, § 1838.
58 Of course a single employing concern which enters into such an agreement binds itself directly.
5 According to one view the contract by which a union or employers'
association is formed is the means by which the individual members severally bind themselves to subsequent collective agreements, to which, howevwr,
the organization itself is not even a party. According to another view the
organization is invested with a fictitious intangible personality which
enables it to represent its members in concluding a collective agreement
but not itself to assume rights and obligations. A third view vests unions
and employers' associations with full juristic personality, which enables
them both to represent their members and themselves to incur rights and
duties. See BRETHE, DE LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DE LA CONVENTION COLLECTIVE
DE TRAVAIL

(1921) 22-57, for a review of these theories.
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spring from contracts of employment, for collective labor agreements seldom purport to create actual labor contracts." They
simply lay down terms and conditions to which the parties are
bound to make their future labor contracts conform.
Without the aid of legislation to breathe life into the foregoing
theory, it is difficult to support in any of its forms. Members of
labor unions and employers' associations seldom agree in fact to
be bound by collective agreements which these organizations may
conclude, and often there are vigorous objections within an association to an agreement which it has made. How then is it possible to hold that such persons are bound by the agreement? I"
Some writers, faced with this objection, have concluded that
collective labor agreements are contracts which unions and employers' associations make for the benefit of their members but
not as their representatives. Thus the members would not be
parties to these agreements but might sue upon them. - The
obvious weakness of this theory is that while it accounts for
individual rights under a collective agreement it does not explain
individual duties, for there is no provision in it for binding a
person by a contract which he has neither authorized nor
ratified.63
A considerable group of writers, driven either by the inadequacy of these individualistic contractual theories or by a predisposition in favor of compulsory collective control of employment relations, have constructed a regulatory theory. This
theory accords such agreements a legal power of control which
is not dependent upon the will of affected individuals. In
various other connections, for reasons of policy, individuals have
been subjected to the collective control of their fellows, organized
for that purpose.6 4 Why not, therefore, workers and employers?
60 See, however, infra p. 1018.
61 One explanation is based on the doctrine of gestion d'affaircs, incorporated in §§ 1372-1375 of the CIvIL CODE, whereby a volunteer may bind a
principal for whom he undertakes to act. BRETHE, op. cit. supra note 59, at
28-29. It is, however, highly doubtful whether a principal can be bound
over his opposition. In any event the doctrine of gestion d'affaires was
devised primarily for the protection of property and business from involuntary neglect by their owners, and it is stretching it almost beyond recognition to apply it to a union which purports to be contracting on behalf of
its members. 23 CARPENTIER ET DU SANT, R9 ERTOIRE G9N9RA1, ALPHABETIQUE DU Dnoyr F
SANrAis
(1900) 297.
6 CIvii, CODE, § 1121; 2 PLANIOL, op.
BREHE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 30-38.

cit. supra note 57, § 1209 et zeq.;

63 Compare Rice, op. cit. supra note 3, at 595.

642 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 57, § 946. There are a number of instances in American law. Thus the creditors of a bankrupt meet to consider their common interests and act by vote of a majority in number and
amount. 11 U. S. C. §§ 91, 92 (1926). In this way they may accept a composition which, if the judge approves, will bind dissenting creditors. Id., §
30. Frequent efforts have also been made to give legislative power over
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M. Jean Brethe, in his study of the legal nature of collective
labor agreements, 5 credits the inspiration of these regulatory
theories to two sources: first, M. Paul-Boncour's thesis 11 that
labor unions and employers' associations must of necessity exercise coercive authority over individual competitors, and second,
M. Leon Duguit's recognition of a type of juristic act which is
binding upon individuals but which is neither official nor contractual in its nature.6 7 Given the economic necessity and the
legal device appropriate to meeting it, one can easily construct
the solution. The formation of a collective agreement becomes,
as it were, an act of private legislation applicable at least to the
members of the groups which enact it and perhaps to others as
well.6 8 For the most part its provisions become operative only
when the workers and employers to whom it applies enter into
employment relations. The employment, though not its terms,
remains a matter of individual choice. 0
In all of the foregoing theories, both individualistic and regulatory, the fixing of wages and working conditions by collective
agreement 70 is, primarily, the phenomenon whose explanation is
sought. Much less difficulty has been experienced in finding a
foundation for whatever rights and duties such an agreement
may attach 7 1 to the organizations that enter into it.7- Obviously
building restrictions to property owners in affected areas. MlBain, Law
Making by Property Owners (1921) 36 POL. Sci. QuAR. 617; State v.
Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 Sup. Ct. 50 (1928).
65 Op. cit. supra note 59, at 57-84.
6OLES RAPPORTS DE L'INDIVIDU ET DES GROUPEMENTS PROFESSIONELS

6

(1900).

,Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 31-32; Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 11;

Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts (1918) 27 YALY

L. J. 753; 1
413.

DUGUIT, TRAIT. DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL

68 See infra under IV,

(3d ed. 1927) 411-

c.

Legislation is necessary, according to all ordinary views of the separation of powers, to authorize the courts to recognize the binding effect of
this new species of juristic act and thus to give effect to the regulatory
theory. It is precisely that which has taken place in Germany. Fuchs, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 9-11.
70L e., in German terms, the effect of the normative provisions of such
agreements, id. at 11.
71 By virtue of what the Germans call obligatory provisions. Ibid.
72 The most extreme individualist theorists refuse to recognize these organizations as the subjects of any rights or duties. This view is correct
where an agreement is negotiated by an informal committee. The Act of
1920, however, vests registered associations with broad capacity to sue and
be sued. Compare infra p. 1024. As to them the matter becomes simply a
question of the scope of this capacity and of the words by which it is explained. BRETHu, op. cit. supra note 59, at 48. At least one writer at the opposite pole has likewise denied that the organizations which form a collective
agreement can be sued upon it, on the ground that they are Invested with
virtually sovereign powers and do not subject themselves to obligations.
Id. at 72, setting forth the theory of M. Pirou.' 69
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these organizations bind themselves to each other directly,
whether the tie be regarded as contractual or not. Thus it has
been said that the obligations arising out of a collective agreement "are manifested in a double classification or, if one wishes,
in two successive stages. There are the immediate obligations,
which proceed directly from the collective agreement, and there
are the eventual obligations, which only appear after an individual labor contract has been concluded by parties subject to the
collective agreement." 7:
III. Collective Agreemnents in JudicialDecisionsand in
Legislation
The French courts prior to the Act of March 25, 1919 proceeded
upon a theory of collective labor agreements which may be stated
as follows: (1) a labor union and an employers' association
contract on their own behalf and become subject to such obligations as the agreement expressly or inpliedly imposes upon them;
(2) individual employers and workers, members of the contracting associations, usually become parties to the agreement tlrough
representation and are obligated to arrange their contracts of
employment in accordance with it; (3) in the event of a variance
between these contracts of employment and the collective agreement the former and not the latter are controlling. The Act
has not modified the first two propositions except in matters of
detail; but it has completely reversed the third proposition,
thereby greatly strengthening collective control.
A.

Obligations of the Contracting Parties

To substantiate the first point, relating to the duties of the contracting associations, it is necessary to resort to inference for
the period prior to 1919, for no decisions bearing directly upon
the point were reported. In one case, a suit for damages against
a local building trades federation on account of a strike which
was alleged to have been in violation of a collective agreement,
the question was raised but not decided. The court of first instance assessed damages of one franc, but the court of appeals
gave judgment for the defendant upon the ground that certain
predecessor unions and not the defendant had entered into the
agreement.7 4 In a leading case it is stated obiter that in entering
into a collective agreement a union "stipulates and promises for
Louis-Lucas, Les conventios coUectives do travail (1919) IS REV.
BsnrEm, op. cit. sTpra note 59,
at 82, where the writer, who supports the regulatory theory in other respects, recognizes that there may be "supplementary" contractual obligations on the part of the negotiators of a collective agreement, such as that
of furthering the adoption of the prescribed terms of employment.
7
1 Chambfty Oct. 4, 1910, D. 1911, I, 187.
'

TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVnL 80. See also
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itself," 75 and in another decision that an association may be
bound by such an agreement when its members are not.10 The
Act of March 25, 1919 appears to be confirming preexisting law
when it prescribes that "groups of employees or employers bound
by a collective labor agreement are obligated to do nothing which
would be of a nature to endanger its execution in good faith." 11
One writer has pointed out that this provision is in effect an
application of section 134 of the Civil Code, in which it is laid
down that "Contracts lawfully entered into have the force of
law for those who have made them" and that "They must be
carried out in good faith." 71 After the passage of the Act a
plasterers' union which called a strike ten days before the expiration of a collective agreement was required to pay 100 francs to
the injured employers' association." It is specifically provided
in the Act that the organizations which form a collective agreement do not guarantee its execution by their members unless a
stipulation to that effect is included.8o
B.

The Mode of Binding Individuals

The fact that when a collective agreement is concluded the members of the contracting associations are bound as principals under
the law of agency raises two questions of importance. The first
is whether they are bound by any obligations that are not conditioned upon the conclusion of actual contracts of employment."'
No theoretical objection appears. In a number of cases where collective agreements purported to create such obligations they were
enforced. Thus where a strike was terminated by a collective
agreement negotiated by associations on each side, whereby the
employers promised to take back the strikers, an employer who
failed to do so was held liable in damages to the injured employees.Y
7

Paris Feb. 6, 1911, infra note 84.

76 Lyon Mar. 10, 1908, infra note 106.
77 LABOR

CODE, bk. I, § 31s.

7s Louis-Lucas, op. cit. supra note 73, at 80.
79 Trib. de Mulhouse Jun. 28, 1923, D. 1925, II, 1. The suit was for 10,000
francs.
so LABOR CODE, bk. I, § 31s. The German courts have held to the same
effect. Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 8, n. 22.
s1 Under the German law no such obligations are recognized. The normative effect of collective agreements is limited to actual employment relations. Fuchs, op. cit. supranote 4, at 13, 17, 43.
82 Cass. Civ. Nov. 24, 1914, S, 1916, I, 99. To the same effect is Paris
Jul. 18, 1922, D. 1926, II, 101. See also Narbonne Jun. 23, 1904, referred
to in the report to the Chamber of Deputies upon the bill which later became
the Acr of 1919, JOURNAL OFFXcmL, DOCUMENTS PARLEMNTAIRES; 10th
Legis., Reg. sess., Jan-May, 1913, at 382. In this case, however, the defendant had entered into the collective agreement directly through her foreman.
It is settled in France that workers who strike terminate their employ-
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The second question is whether in a particular case the employers and workers have in fact been represented by the persons
who negotiated the collective agreement. Prior to the Act of 1919
there were no settled criteria for aetermining this question.
Where an affirmative conclusion was reached it seems often to
have been assumed rather than consciously arrived at on the
basis of the facts in the case. The matter was explicitly considered by the Court of Cassation in a case in which a suit for wages
was brought by two stonemasons. The plaintiffs claimed according to a collective agreement which had been concluded between
their union and an employers' association of which the defendant
was a member. The defendant maintained that he was not bound
by the agreement, against which he had protested from the beginning. The lower court found that the defendant had remained
a member of the employers' association after the agreement had
been regularly entered into and that there was no express stipulation between him and the plaintiffs for any other than the
prescribed wages. Accordingly it rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs, which was affirmed. 83 It is difficult to support this decision upon principles of agency unless the constitution of the
employers' association explicitly bound the members to future
collective agreements. There was no finding to this effect. In a
subsequent case in a lower court, where a finding was made that
the constitution of an employers' association did not authorize it
to bind its members by collective agreements, certain of the
latter, made defendants in an action by a union, were held not
to be bound by the association's agreement with the union.8
The Act of March 25, 1919 enacts substantially the points
decided by the Court of Cassation in 1910. The Act of 18S4 relating to economic associations had guaranteed the right of individual members to withdraw at any time, subject to their current
obligation to pay dues.8 ' The Act of 1919 provides that a collecments. Hence in neither of the above cases were there labor contracts to
which the defendants' obligations could be said to attach. In Germany the
principal case would have been decided the other way. Fuchs, op. cit. szpra
note 4, at 19-21. Whether a strike ought to be held to terminate the strikers'
employment is a matter of dispute among writers. See the note by B1. Paul
Pic, D. 1909, H, 121, and authorities cited.
s3 Cass. Civ. Jul. 7, 1910, D. 1911, I, 201, S. 1912, I, 206. Narbonne Mar.
2, 1909, referred to in the report to the Chamber of Deputies, supra note
82, comes to the same conclusion.
s4 Paris Feb. 6, 1911, D. 1912, II, 289. If the terms of a collective agreement are sufficiently generally followed to make them a usage, they may,
of course, bind even non-members of the organizations which framed them
unless these individuals take care to stipulate to the contrary. Juge de
pabK de Narbonne Nov. 11, 1905, rep. to the Chamber of Deputies, supra
note 82, at 383.
- The provision, as amended by the AcT OF MAIL 12, 1920, is now LEon
CODE, bk. III, § 8.
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tive labor agreement must be written and deposited with certain
conseils de prud'hwmmes 1; or justices of the peace, according to
the agreement's geographical scope, before it can go into effect.
From that day forth it binds all parties who have signed it personally or by agent authorized thereto in writing. It also binds
those members of the signatory organizations who do not resign
and give public notice of their resignations within eight days.,,
Members who join subsequently are likewise bound., Agreements may be of indefinite duration, subject to the withdrawal of
any signatory party upon one month's notice,89 or they may be of
fixed duration. 0 The latter bind the members of the signatory
organizations for the specified period only where they have
given written authorizations or subsequent written adhesions0 1
In all other instances of collective agreements for definite or for
indefinite periods a member of a signatory organization may resign from it and withdraw from the agreement upon one month's
public notice.9 2 Thus the fact of membership in a contracting
labor or employers' organization draws with it the legal consequence of. participation in a collective agreement which the organization has concluded, subject only to withdrawal in the
prescribed manner. Many troublesome questions of agency are
eliminated by this legislative declaration. One is perhaps justified
in assuming that a strong union or employers' association will
find ways to prevent withdrawals of so formal a character. Hence
in effect, it is more difficult than before for the members of such
an organization to resist being controlled by the collective agreements into which it enters.
Questions regarding the authority of organizations to enter
into collective agreements cannot, however, be entirely abolished
by legislative fiat, nor has so bold an attempt been made. The
difficulties which remain are increased by the continued recognition of informal, temporary groups and committees as proper
parties to collective labor agreements.0 3 Of necessity, therefore,
86 The conseils de prud'hommes are small-claims labor courts, established
by statute. See infra p. 1025.
87 The period allowed for resignations is limited to three days in the caso
of an agreement which terminates a strike or lockout.
88 LABOR CODE, bk. I, §§ 31c, 31k.
891d. §§ 31e, 31f, 31m.
90Id. § 31e. The specified period may not be greater than five years. Id.
§ 31g.
91Id § 311.
02 Id. § 31n.
93LABOR CODE, bk. I, § 31, defines the collective labor agreement as a
"contract relative to conditions of work, concluded between, on the one
hand, the representatives of a trade union or any group of employees and,
on the other hand, the representatives of a trade association or any other
group of employers or several employers contracting in their own names
or even a single employer."
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it remains to be determined in each case whether the association
or group is authorized to conclude this sort of contract. If it is,
its members are subject to the foregoing provisions of the Act
of 1919; if not, there cannot be a collective agreement at all. The
statute recognizes several ways in which an association or group
may be empowered to conclude a collective labor agreement.
These are: by provision in its constitution or by-laws, by special
authorization of a meeting of the group, or by written authorization from all of its members individually. An agreement already
concluded may, also, be ratified by a meeting of the group. No
procedural safeguards are laid down. On the contrary, "The
groups themselves determine their mode of deliberation." 1' It
is largely on this account, no doubt, that the Court of Cassation
has refused to uphold judgments of the lower courts against
individuals upon collective agreements, unless accompanied in
each instance by a specific finding that the defendant was bound
by the agreement in the manner laid down in the statute.05
C.

The Effect of Variant Individual Contracts

Prior to the Act of 1919 the terms of a collective labor agreement
applicable to an individual contract of employment might be
superseded by conflicting provisions in the individual contract itself. The employer or employee, however, who thus derogated
from the authority of the agreement, became liable in damages
to the other parties to it. The situation was neatly illustrated
by two companion cases. In one, a worker sued for wages according to the rate laid down in a collective agreement. He had been
a member of the union at the time the agreement was concluded
but had resigned upon accepting employment at a lower scale.
The lower wage had been paid him. The defendant remained a
member of the employers' association with which the agreement
had been concluded. A judgment for the defendant was affirmed
by the Court of Cassation upon the ground that, even assuming
the plaintiff's employment to have been subject to the collective
agreement, he was bound by his individual contract.w In the
other case the same defendant was sued by the union for damages
on account of his cutting of wages. He admitted the facts but
pleaded his inability to pay more and the desire of the workers
94Id.

§ 31b.

- Cass. Civ. Feb. 11, 1920, D. 1920, I, 111; Jan. 5, 1921, S. 1921, I, 367;
Jun. 30, 1925, Bull. Cass. Civ. D 25, at 234; Feb. 11, 1929, S. 1929, I, 208.
In a decision of Jun. 21, 1927, Bull. Cass. Civ. 1927, ati 198, it was held
that seventeen months' acceptance by certain employers of the terms of a
collective agreement which had been voluntarily concluded in their behalf
by a single employer in settlement of a strike, could not bind them under
the statute.
96 Cass. Civ. Dec. 16, 1908, S. 1912, I, 201; Cass. Civ. Aug. 2, 1911, D.
1912, I, 76, S. 1912, I, 201, is to the same effect.
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to accept reduced incomes rather than none at all. The Nimes
Court of Commerce refused to consider the ethics of the defendant's conduct and assessed fifty francs damages against him
on account of his violation of the collective agreement01
In reversing the doctrine of the Court of Cassation in the
former of the two foregoing cases the legislature of 1919 made
its most radical advance in the direction of collectivism. Having
safeguarded the formal right of the individual to escape from
the control of a collective labor agreement, it proceeded to subject him to that control if he failed to employ the designated mode
of withdrawal. For: "When a contract intervenes between an
employee and an employer who should ... be considered as subject, respectively, to the obligations resulting from the collective
labor agreement, the rules established by this agreement, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, apply to the relations established by the foregoing labor contract." "" The statute,
furthermore, establishes a presumption that where only one of
the parties to a labor contract is bound by a collective agreement
the terms of the agreement are embodied in the individual contract. 9
The former of these two provisions does not seem to have been
explicitly applied in an appellate case, but its meaning is not in
doubt. In a court of first instance, recovery of wages according
to a collective agreement has been allowed notwithstanding an
express contract for lower pay.100 The second provision has been
held inoperative to alter the pre-existing terms of employment
of a worker whose union has concluded a collective agreement
with other employers than his own. The statutory presumption,
in other words, does not overcome the effect of a previous course
of dealing.'0 '
D.

Enforcement by Civil Action

It was settled prior to the Act of 1919 that both individuals and
groups who were parties to collective labor agreements might
sue to enforce them, each according to his or its own interest.
The question of when a union or an employers' association might
sue was, of course, affected by the extent of the recognition of
collective interests in tort actions, which is discussed above. A
conservative decision of the Court of Cassation in 1893 no doubt
discouraged organizations from bringing actions. In the case
in question a textile operator was sued by a union of workers
97 Nimes Trib. de Com. Aug. 7, 1907, S. 1912, 1, 201.
98 LABOR CODE, bk. I, § 31p.

99 Id. § 31r.
100 Seine, Cons. de Prud'hommes, Nov. 13, 1920, BULL. MIN. DU TIA,,
1921, at 81.
10, Cass. Civ. Mar. 7, 1921, S. 1923, I, 30.
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for alleged violation of the wage and hours provisions of a collective agreement. The union's right to bring the action was
denied, upon the ground that the lower court had found that
only the union's members, through its officers as agents, and not
the union itself had become parties to the agreement, and that
the union had not itself been damaged by the defendant's acts. 2
It is doubtful whether the lower court intended its language to
be construed as a finding that the union had not contracted on
its own behalf; and its statement as to the incidence of the damage was a mere conclusion. Subsequent commentators pointed
out that the decision of the Court of Cassation was to be taken
in relation to the supposed facts and predicted freely that in
another case the Court would sustain a union's light to sue for
a similar breach of a collective agreement.0 3
Meanwhile some of the lower courts ignored the decision of
the Court of Cassation. In one case the right of a union to sue
a wage-cuffing employer upon a collective agreement made with
it was upheld almost without discussion and damages for the
injury to the union's interests were allowed." In another instance 1000 francs were awarded to a union against an employer
who in violation of a collective agreement cut wages, required
excess hours of labor, and discharged employees because of their
I
membership in the union. The court said:
"The union had a material and moral interest in the execution
of the contract; . . . the moral interest is undeniable; ... the
material damage results from the inevitable difficulty of recruiting or retaining members if the employers can with impunity
render naught the efforts put forth by the union to ameliorate
the condition of the worker." 105
In a third ease 106 a union of traction employees sued to enforce
specifically 0 7 a collective agreement which had been abrogated
by the company with which it was made. The agreement contained provisions for rest days and vacations, whose operation
102 Cass. Civ. Feb. 1, 1893, D. 1593, I, 241, S. 1896, I, 329.
103 Capitant, note in D. 1909, II, 33; Wahl, note in S. 1912, I, 201; rp.

to Chamber of Deputies, supra note 82, at 396.
10-1 Nimes Trib. de Com., supra note 97.
103 Beauvais Mar. 29, 1912, D. 1912, II, 294.
100 Lyon Mlar. 10, 1908, D. 1909, II, 33, S. 1910, II, 49.
107 Although most of the actions upon collective labor agreements have
been for damages (compare the similar situation in Germany, Fuchs, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 26, n. 68), there is no doubt of the availability of specific performance, enforced by a pecuniary penalty for continued refusal. 2
PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 57, at 71-74. In the case in question the court
of first instance ordered the company to abide by the agreement upon pain
of paying 100 francs a day-a remedy which seems far more effective than
those usually employed.
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was disturbed by the Weekly-Day-of-Rest Act of July 13, 1906.'1
The main question in the case related to the revocability of the
agreement under the circumstances. While deciding largely
against the workers upon this point, the court of appeals was
at pains to justify the union's right to bring the action. On
appeal by the union to the Court of Cassation the question of the
union's right to prosecute the suit was not raised. °D
The problem which thus troubled the courts and the writers
has largely been eliminated by the Collective Agreement Act of
1919, which provides:
"Groups having capacity to sue, which are parties to a collective labor agreement, may bring actions arising out of the agreement in favor of their several members without having to present
an express authorization from the party concerned, provided the
latter has been advised and has not declared himself opposed
[to the action]. The party concerned may always intervene in
the suit commenced by the group." 110
Thus the power of labor unions and employers' associations
to assert in court the individual and collective interests of the
workers and employers under a collective agreement is completed.
The attempt of a miners' union under this provision of the
statute to collect 40,000 francs back pay for its members, which
the defendant was alleged to have withheld in violation of a collective agreement with the plaintiff, was frustrated because the
agreement had not been filed in accordance with the Act. The
Court of Cassation, however, upheld the union's right to sue. It
declared further that it was unnecessary for the union to name
the precise parties on whose behalf it was bringing the action,
whose identity might just as well be determined later by a commissioner appointed by the trial court. It held, moreover, that
a meeting of the union, at which its officers were authorized to
institute the action, gave sufficient notice to all of its members
to satisfy the requirements of the statute."'
In another case of the same general nature the action of a
union was defeated by the highly questionable device of a court
of first instance. A ship-builders' union sued an employer in
behalf of its members and in its own behalf on account of wage
cutting which clearly violated a collective agreement. The reduction in pay had been accepted by the defendant's employees in
a meeting called for the purpose, as the only means of securing
os Now incorporated, as subsequently modified, in LABOR CODE, bk. II,
§§ 30-50b.
109 Cass. Req. Jul. 26, 1909, S. 1910, I, 71.
1o LABOR CODE, bk. I, § Slv.
-1 Cass. Civ. May 1, 1923, D. 1923, I, 66, S. 1923, 1, 372.
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employment after a two-months' layoff. The court conceded the
union's right to recover for its own damage but held that the
members in whose behalf it pretended to sue had waived their
rights of action, which could no more be exercised for them than
they could exercise them themselves.'
It does not appear how
many of the defendant's employees attended the meeting at which
the alleged waiver took place or how many voted to accept the
reduction in pay. Thus, in effect, the action of an inchoate body
of workers was seized upon to remove virtually all legal sanction
from an agreement which, under the statute, remained in full
force and superseded conflicting individual contracts of employment. The damage suffered by the union was fixed at one franc,
for which judgment was solemnly rendered. 123
The system of remedies, with which the Act of 1919 supports
collective labor agreements, is rounded out by certain rights of
intervention in pending suits which the statute accords as follows:
"When an action arising out of a collective labor agreement
is commenced, whether by an individual or by a group, the other
groups having capacity to appear in court, whose members are
bound by the agreement, may at any time intervene in the pending action on account of the collective interest which the decision
of the case has for their members." 114
It is the ordinary civil courts, as is apparent from the foregoing cases, which have jurisdiction of actions brought upon
collective labor agreements. These consist of the justice of the
peace for petty cases, the departmental tribunals of first instance,
the district courts of appeal, and the Court of Cassation.W1 For
cases involving individual contracts of employment, however, the
justices of the peace and ordinary tribunals are supplanted in
many localities by consells de prud,'hommes, or councils of experts, composed of equal numbers of employers and employees.
These are chosen by vote of the employers and employees respectively, in accordance with a procedure laid down by statuteu"o
and by supplementary administrative decrees. Their decisions
1- It seems unnecessary to burden the text by demonstrating that ordinarily, since the adoption of the Acr OF 1919, an employee may resort to

court to enforce his contract of employment according to its terms as laid
down in an applicable collective agreement. It has been noted that the
statute declares these terms to be binding (text szpr note 98). This view
was followed by the Court of Cassation in Cass. Civ. Feb. 15, 1021, b. 1921,

1, 368.

113 Trib. Civ. de St. Nazaire Jul. 21, 1922, D. 1925, II, 1.
-4 LABOR CODE, bk. I, § 31v.
"L5The system is described in Perroud, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1. Occasionally a court of commerce obtains jurisdiction of a collective agreement
case. Supra note 104.
-6 LABOR CODE, bk. IV.
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are subject to appeal, as are those of the justices of the peace,
in cases involving 1000 francs or more. It is settled that where
a dispute involves a collective agreement and not primarily the
individual contracts of employment formed under it, the conscils
de prud'hommes have no-jurisdiction. Thus, the action of a civil
tribunal in reversing the judgment of a conscil de pnud'honmcs
for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by the Court of Cassation
in a suit by a union to compel the observance of a pay increase
alleged to have been provided in a collective agreement between
the plaintiff and the defendant. The union, although it asked for
damages as well as specific performance, was regarded by the
11
court as proceeding primarily in its own behalf.
IV. Collective Agreements and Compudsory Control of
Employment Relations
It has been pointed out in the foregoing pages of this study that
the courts and the legislature of France have continued to regard
individual freedom of contract as basic in the entire system of
labor law. They have refused to subscribe to the theory which
would conclusively subject individual labor contracts to regulation through agreement between unions and employers' associations. They have, on the contrary, been careful to provide a
procedure whereby the single employer or worker may manifest
his independence of an arrangement so arrived at. At the same
time collective control through agreement has in fact been
strengthened by the introduction into the law of a number of
aids. These are: (1) the establishment of membership in a
group of workers or employers having collective bargaining for
one of its purposes as tentatively sufficient to bind the individual
by a collective agreement which the group may conclude; (2)
the legal determination of the terms of individual labor contracts
by applicable collective agreements; and (3) the recognition of
the power of unions and employers' associations to represent in
court the interests, under such an agreement, of their members
as well as of themselves. These aids are probably sufficient in
a strongly organized trade or industry to subject individual labor
contracts quite thoroughly to control by collective agreement.
It has been noted, however, that French unionism on the whole
has not been strong but weak, with only partial and unstable
organization. An important problem, therefore, has continued
to be competition between the organized and the unorganized,
with the attendant necessity of guarding against deterioration
in labor standards and of preventing defections from the unions
through the pressure of economic necessity. The fighting weapons
of unionism have at best, as has been mentioned, an uncertain
117

Cass. Civ. Jan. 4, 1928, D. H. 1928, p. 152, S. 1928, I, 86.

19321

COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS

1021,7

legal status."s Therefore measures have at times been attempted
to safeguard by legal means such control as has been established
through collective agreement. Three types of reinforcement are
possible in addition to the ordinary judicial remedies already
discussed. These are (1) the establishment of special adjustment
or enforcement agencies; (2) the barring of outsiders from
employment through provisions for exclusive dealing, such as a
union, or "closed," shop clause in a collective agreement; and
(3) the administrative interposition of the state in suppolt of
regulations laid down by collective agreement.
A. Conciaion and Arbitration mnder Collective Ag'ccmciits
Prior to the Act of 1919 it pretty clearly was illegal for a union
and an employers' association to set up an agency for the compulsory adjustment of future labor disputes. 1 9 The only reported
case involving the point is inconclusive,-" but the Code of Civil
Procedure - invalidates any arbitration agreement which does
not specify the exact matter in dispute and the names of the
arbitrators, thus making it impossible to provide for the adjustment of future controversies by other means than through the
courts. An Act of December 27, 1892 22- provides machinery for
voluntary conciliation and, if settlement of the difficulty does not
result, voluntary arbitration of collective labor disputes under
the aegis of a justice of the peace. But this machinery exists only
for specific controversies and cannot be used as a permanent
agency for the maintenance of collective control of employment
relations.
The Act of 1919, however, provides that a collective labor
agreement may include a clause for the submission of all or a,
portion of the disputes arising out of the agreement to parties
designated in the agreement, or to be designated in the manner
prescribed therein; and such a clause is declared valid.- 3 No
cases involving this provision seem to have been reported, but
advantage has frequently been taken of it in collective agreements. Prior to 1926 the conclusion of 138 agreements contain11s An attempt has been made by
FRAN CE (1921)

RAixAUD,

LE CONTRAT coLIIIp

Eiz

243-256, to classify definitely the measures which labor
unions and employers' associations may take in their efforts to enforce or to
extend collective agreements by bringing economic pressure to bcar. The
cases which he cites are pertinent to the problem, but their net effect can
by no means be precisely catalogued.
"'Id. at 231; 0uALm Er PICQUTEN:i.%m, op. cit. svipra note 20, at 313.
o Cass. Req. Jan. 25, 1905, supra note 42. It is not certain whether the
court viewed the conciliation clause there in question as compulsory or
voluntary.
I § 1006.
LABoR CODE, bk. IV, §§ 104-118.

122

123 Id.bk. I, § 3x.
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ing such clauses was reported,-4 and thirteen more were recorded
in 1926 and 1927.12 It is reasonable to suppose that these agreements were effected in the better-organized industries. Although
collective labor agreements cannot be made for longer fixed
periods than five years, they can be allowed to remain in force indefinitely. With the aid of machinery for the settlement of difficulties and perhaps for the adjustment of wages to meet changing conditions, it is more probable than it would be otherwise that
collective agreements can be erected into permanent bases of
control with sufficient strength and flexibility to overcome outside competition.
B. "Closed" Shop Agreements
Reported cases which pass upon "closed" shop agreements are
too few to furnish the basis of an appraisal of the operation of
French law in this matter. It is clear, as might have been expected, that the predictability of decisions is at a minimum.
When the question did arise in the Court of Cassation the suit
was not brought to enforce the "closed" shop clause, but was a
tort action against a union, brought by discharged members of
a rival organization. Their grievance was that the "closed" shop
clause in the defendant's agreement with their employer had
been carried out upon the union's insistence. In such a suit motives enter in, as in other instances of economic coercion; the
absolute, mutually exclusive principles of individualism and collectivism are involved; 6 and economic facts, which vary from
case to case, cannot be excluded from consideration. In the case
in question the agreement which established the "closed" shop
applied to the building industry of Halluin and was to endure
for six years. The Court of Cassation was supplied with no finding by the lower court that either the motives or the methods
of the defendant were improper. It applied the rule of thumb
that the monopoly established by the agreement, being limited
as to both time and place, was lawful. Consequently a judgment
in favor of the defendant was affirmed. 12'
It may be deduced from the court's reasoning that a "closed"
shop agreement becomes illegal whenever it controls a sufficient
ET PICQUENARD, op. cit. supra
BULL. MIN. DU TRAv. (1927) 277; id.

note 20, at 495.
(1928) at 158.
12 Compare inf'ra pp. 1010-1011.
The Court of Appeals of Douai, from
which the instant case was appealed, noted "that freedom of labor and the
right of the worker to join or not to join a union are ultimately to be recognized, and that the courts are explicitly charged with the duty of assuring
their maintenance," but also "that it is nevertheless true that these privileges, however sacred, are necessarily limited by the principle of the freedom
to form agreements, provided these are not contrary to public order or
morals." Quoted in RAYNAUD, op. cit. supra note 118, at 224.
127 Cass. Civ. Oct. 24, 1916, D. 1916, I, 246, S. 1920, I, 17.
124 OUALm
125
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area of competition to be really effective in maintaining standards. Nor is it likely that the law's abhorrence of monopoly will
be greatly relaxed so long as unions and employers' associations
are largely unregulated and hence free, except when controlled
by civil action, to exclude members and to govern their internal
affairs as they choose.-s And if this were not so, it would still
be true that effective exclusion of non-union competition by
"closed" shop agreements would be impossible in most of the
industry and commerce of France because of the partial scope of
French unionism.
C.

Extension by Officiol Action of Control by Collcetive
Agreement

The problem of overcoming harmful competition with the control established by collective agreement, then, is largely a problem
in France of extending that control rather than of protecting
a regulatory power which is adequate even for the time being.
To this problem the question of the legality of the fighting devices of unions and employers' associations is directly pertinent.
That question is shrouded in uncertainty, as has been noted; and
it is likely to remain uncertain for the same reasons that success
itself is of doubtful legality-the lack of guaranties, namely, that
a favorable economic position will not be exploited for unsocial
ends. At least a formal guaranty to this effect can be supplied,
however, if the extension of the partial control achieved by a
collective agreement is made to depend upon a governmental
decree; for the official entrusted with the function of effecting
the extension can be charged with the duty of acting only in
cases where the general welfare will be served. A system of this
sort has been in force in Germany since the war, where extensions by the Minister of Labor of the employment conditions laid
down in collective agreements have been a normal feature of
the control recognized and established by law. = O In France the
same idea has been gaining ground in statutes which govern
specific aspects of employment.
'-8 The only legal requirements for associations registered under the AcT
M Au 20, 1884, are that their constitutions and by-laws and the names
of their officers be recorded and that the latter be French citizens. LABon
CODE, bk. III, §§ 3, 4. Moreover, the political and religious aspects of many
French unions make it less possible to sustain their exercise of exclusive
economic power. Bonnecase, note in S. 1920, I, 17. However, an economic
association can be made to answer to an injured member for a violation of
its own constitution in expelling him. Cass. Req. Mar. 15, 1910, D. 1913,
V, 30. Conversely he may be sued for breach of his obligations to it, provided, of course, that these are not unlawful. Lyon Nov. 11, 1921, D. 1923,
II, 150, in which participation in a lockout was held to have been the legal
duty of the defendant. But see Riom, May 27, 1922, D. 1923, II, 150.
-9 Fuchs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 10, 16-17, 34-3G.
OF
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The idea of official intervention to regulate the terms and conditions of employment gained a great deal of ground in France
during the war, when stoppages of production had to be prevented at all costs. In January, 1917 strikes and lockouts were
forbidden and compulsory conciliation and arbitration were instituted in establishments subject to the jurisdiction of the Minister
of Armaments. Provision was also made for the extension of
arbitral decrees to parties not originally subject to them."' This
war-time regulation was, in large part, a development of the
theory of the decrees of August 10, 1899, whereby labor conditions in the establishments of public contractors were subjected
to control. 13' In these decrees it was specified that normal current wages for the locality should be paid and that in ascertaining them the officials charged with enforcement should "refer
so far as possible to agreements existing between associations
of employers and workers in the locality or region." M Thus a
limited extension was in effect given to collective agreements.
Apparently the ordinary courts were also called upon under
certain circumstances during the war to apply collective labor
agreements to workers who in normal times would not have
been subject to them. Thus in a case which was appealed to
the Court of Cassation, the plaintiff was a member of the military forces who had been ordered to *iork in the defendant's
factory. He sued for his pay, which the court below determined
according to a collective agreement then in force in the locality
but not in the defendant's plant. The court was carrying out
the requirement of the Act of August 17, 1915, under which the
plaintiff had been assigned, which called for the payment of
wages at prevailing rates. The judgment was affirmed.1 3
After the war a number of enactments for the improvement
of labor conditions made use of the same device of relying upon
collective agreements for the guidance of administrative officials.
The Act of April 23, 1919 established the principle of the
eight-hour day, leaving its application to industries and trades
throughout the country to be effected by administrative decrees.
"These decrees shall have reference to agreements, wherever they
exist, between national or regional organizations of interested
employers or workers." 134 The application of the eight-hour day
is not yet complete, but it is steadily being extended."" A num130 SCELLE, PRECIS 9L9MENTAIRE DE LEGISLATION INDUSTRIELLE (1927) 84;
OUALID ET PICQUENARD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 34-40.
131 OUALm ET PICQUENARD, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 35; INT. LAD. OFF., Op.
cit. supra note 17, at 164.
'132 BULLETIN

133

DES LOIS, v. 374, at 2155, 2157, 2159.

Cass. Civ. Feb. 22, 1921, S. 1922, 1, 14.

LABOR CODE, bk. II. § 7.
135 Not without some departure from the spirit of the law, however, such
134

as that involved in the decree of Sep. 14, 1922, which lengthened the hours
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ber of national agreements for applying its provisions were
framed almost at once 130 and by 1924 thirty decrees had sanc-

tioned pre-existing agreements for carrying out the law, applying
them to 5,000,000 workers237 Not all decrees, of course, even in
cases where collective agreements exist, accept their provisions
without change; for it is settled that the administrative authorities are vested with ultimate discretion in the matter2 3
In even more thoroughgoing fashion the amendment of December 29, 1923 to the Weekly Day-of-Rest Act of July 13, 1906
places an official sanction behind certain collective labor agree-

ments. The original Act authorized the prefects of departments
to adjust the law to industries and trades in which the simple
Sunday holiday was impracticable and required them in doing so
to consult affected unions and employers' associations.23 9 The
amendment authorized these same officials, in any case in which
the unions and employers' associations in a trade or industry
formed an agreement regarding a uniform day of rest, to order
the closing of all similar establishments in the affected region in
1 The prefect, presumably, may
accordance with the agreement.40
refuse a decree when it would not be in the public interest to
grant one; but if he acts, he extends the agreement unmodified to
persons who are not parties to it. Its violation then becomes an
offense against the Act. In no other way, of course, could associations that do not include an entire trade effect the advance which
the statute is designed to further. The legislature has responded
by authorizing a sanction that shuts out subversive competition.
Occasional innovations of a positive nature have been introduced
by means of the foregoing pr6cedure. Thus the closing of pharmacies on Sundays has been accompanied by the provision of
emergency prescription service, sanctioned by official decree.41
A further step, involving the sanctioning of collective agreements even without official decrees to support them, may have
been taken in the Act of July 19, 1928, relating to dismissal of
on duty, if not of actual work, which might be required of railroad employees.
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 97.
1 36
OUALm Lr PICQuENARD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 492.
137 Id. at 497.

138 Conseil d'Etat Mar. 27, 1925, Recueil des arrtts du Conseil d'Etat,
1925, at 342, sustaining as valid the decree cited su:pra note 135. The actual
authority of a collective agreement is likely to be greater than that contemplated in the law. Thus it has been stated that the decree in question
had already been modified so as to give "full satisfaction" to the plaintiffs
whose legal attack upon it was defeated. IN-r. LAn. OFF., op. cit. supra note

17, at 167.
139 LABOR CODE,

bk. II, § 35. A similar provision was included in the eight-

hour law. Id. § 7.
14o d&§ 43a.
14 Conseil d'Etat Mar. 27, 1925, Jul. 10, 1925, Jul. 17, 1925, ArrZts, 1925,
at 335, 675, 697.
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workers. It is provided that dismissals of workers with less than
the period of notice "determined by local and trade custom, or,
failing such custom, by collective agreement" shall be actionable.
"The periods fixed by custom," it is further enacted, "may be
altered by collective agreement," and "any clause of an individual
contract or of rules of employment fixing a period of notice
shorter than that established by custom or collective agreement
shall be null and void." 112 It is contended that under this provision a collective agreement, even though it does not govern the
parties in other respects and does not establish a custom, may
be applied to a particular case of discharge. 143
In 1919, at the time of the final passage of the present Collective Agreement Act, it was proposed in the Senate that the legislature authorize the extension of collective agreements in their
entirety by decree of the Minister of Labor. Although the pro14
posal was defeated, it had strong support. '
V.

Progress and Impediments

The justification of the movement toward the determination of
employment relations by collective agreement is stated in substantially the same terms by numerous students of the problem.
Its purpose is to establish a just and responsible control of wages
and working conditions in place of their dictation by employers.
Individual freedom of contract, although perhaps adequate in its
day, has under modern conditions evolved into wage scales and
shop rules which employers prescribe and employees must take
or leave. The essence of the labor contract, in other words, is
not contractually determined. To remedy this situation collective
bargaining makes use of the principle of freedom at the only
point in the fixation of wages and working conditions at which
freedom can operate-the point, namely, at which a determination is made of what is to be offered the worker. At that point
collective bargaining seeks to place two agencies of negotiation
which shall be approximately equal in strength and which can
effectively represent the parties to the ultimate labor contract.
The result of their dealings is embodied in a compact which, in
France, the courts and the legislature have supported with a
legal sanction.
The value of this sanction can hardly be judged finally from
the data which have been examined for this study. From the
doctrinal standpoint few adverse criticisms can be offered. A
catalog of the rights and duties which originate in collective labor
agreements under French law reveals no omissions. The reme142 LABOR CODE,

bk. I, § 23.

143 Picard, French Legislation on the Dismissal of Workers (1931)
INT. LAB. REV. 10.
144 Pirou, op. cit. supra note 1, at 48.
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dies offered are the most effective known to French procedure
and they are available to any party against any other partyoften by means of the cheap, informal process which the conscils
de prud'ihommes supply. If originally, in order to bind individuals to agreements which their groups had framed, the principles of agency were severely stretched, the danger of their
breaking has long since been removed by legislation. If, in consequence, obligations which actually rest upon the authority of
the group are commonly labelled contractual, it is only the theorist, concerned about the neatness of his categories, who need be
troubled. The individualist principle of the freedom of the single
employer or worker to withdraw from the control of a collective
agreement and the collectivist principle of his inability to make
a conflicting labor contract if he does not withdraw, represent
as fair and workable a compromise as could be devised between
two general views, neither of which is as yet entitled to exclusive
possession of the field.
How truly the reported decisions of the French courts reflect
what actually happens in the much larger number of decided
cases is perhaps open to question.145 French writers themselves
assume that the picture is accurate, and it seems to be fairly
complete as regards the appellate courts. There is, of course, no
doctrine of stare declifs to insure the application of precedents,
but the moral authority of the decisions of at least the Court of
Cassation appears to be quite high.4 6 On the other hand, even
in a case itself, in which points of law are decided by the Court
of Cassation on the basis of facts reported by a court of appeals,
the cause is always remanded for a new trial if the judgment
below is not affirmed. A slightly different view of the facts may
there be taken upon the retrial, which will render the highest
court's propositions of law inapplicable. 4 7 The conscils de prud'hommes, moreover, in which many of the cases arise, are lay
tribunals. "Since they owe their positions to election, they are
much less sensitive than professional judges to the censure of
the Court of Cassation, and are likely to be more afraid of the
censure of the trades they represent." 148 There have been instances in which labor candidates have secured election to the
145The reported cases are those chosen by the two leading law publisher.
and by a very selective official reporter of the Court of Cessation, supplemented in the field of labor law by cases included in the Bulletin of the
Minister of Labor.
14G Lambert, Pic and Garraud, op. cit. supra note 24. The writers allege
that the sections of the Civil Code, which theoretically are controlling upon
the courts, often serve as mere "screens" for the real bases of judicial decisions. See also STUmBERG, GUME TO THE LAW AND LEGAL LiTERwTUE op
147

(1931) 19.
Perroud, op. cit. spra note 48, at 10.

'14

Lambert, Pic and Gerraud, op. cit. supra note 24, at 5.
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conseils de prud'hornmes by promising to apply collective agreements to employers who were not legally subject to them.1 4'
Nevertheless the lack of adequate legal sanction has been given
as one reason for the slow spread of collective labor agreements
in France before the war.510 And perhaps the value of a thoroughgoing legal application of such agreements is reflected in the
attitude of the General Confederation of Labor, which opposed
the Act of 1919 before its passage 'a, but approved of it afterward.1 52 It is not unlikely, moreover, that legal sanctions occupy
a larger place in popular esteem under a system which actually
provides "justice for the poor" 1"3
than would be appreciated in a
country such as the United States where the courts are virtually
closed to small claimants. If so, legal theory and the actual application of law will bear a fairly close relation to each other.
In such larger matters as dealing with strikes in violation of
collective agreements, there is little evidence that control through
the courts plays any direct part. As has been noted, the few
judgments that have been rendered have been for almost nominal
amounts. As against the unions, moreover, damages often will
be uncollectible; for much of the property which a union is
likely to own is exempt from execution.'" Strike reserves, however, may be reached. Contempt procedure to enforce injunctions
or decrees of specific performance is not employed in France.'
From the economic standpoint anything less than complete
control of a competitive field by a collective agreement is unsatisfactory. Except in a few matters such as the eight-hour day,
French law has not accorded or even attempted to encourage such
control, and the problem of how it is to be attained remains for
solution.156 Two types of proposals have been made. The first
type contemplates the general employment of official decrees to
extend collective agreements to parties who otherwise would not
be controlled by them.'- Besides abandoning contractual fixation
249 RAYNAuD,

op. cit. supra note 118, at 253-4.

OUALID ET PICQUENARD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 279.
51-ROuAST, LES CONVENTIONS COLLECTIVES DE TRAVAIL ET LA LOI DU

1O

25

MARS 1919 (1924) 58-59; rep. to Chamber of Deputies, supra note 82, at
439-440.
135CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 78.
153 No costs or fees of any kind need be paid by the parties to litigation
before the conseils de prud'hommes. LABOR CODE, bk. IV, § 50.
14 RAYNAUD, op. cit. supra note 118, at 238 n. 1.
155 2 PLANIoL, op. cit. supra note 57, at 61.
156 "In our opinion the collective agreement

will not have its full value,
its entire effectiveness, its full character, until the day when it binds the
entire trade without any possible exception, when it will be the law of the
trade." Report to the Chamber of Deputies, supra note 82, at 449.
U7 A bill to this effect, providing, however, for consultation of the affected
parties, was passed by the Chamber of Deputies and considered by the
Senate, together with a substitute proposition, at the same time that the
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of working conditions in favor of regulation from above for those
workers and employers to whom agreements are extended, this
procedure might seriously weaken the unions and employers' associations by extending their chief benefits to non-members, thus
encouraging the avoidance of the payment of dues and other
forms of participation in their affairs. Both objections are
serious. The principle of freedom, so basic in the constitutional
law of France and of the United States, should not be lightly
abandoned in favor of control by authority, unless that authority
is directly answerable to the persons immediately concerned.1
What is needed is an effective, socially guided expression of freedom and responsibility, rather than the supplanting of this democratic ideal or the weakening of the agencies through which it
is seeking to find expression in modern industry and commerce.
A system which may work well in Germany, where authority has
long held sway in politics and where democratic control in industry paradoxically is more firmly established than farther to the
west, may not be capable of simple transplantation elsewhere.
Mlore hopeful is the other type of proposal for strengthening
control by collective agreement, which contemplates universal
organization for collective bargaining, with compulsory participation by workers and employers.1 3 It raises two problems, however. The first problem grows out of the fact that the more
common type of labor union and association of employers, formed
for limited purposes, is not the only conceivable basis for the
control of employment relations. The company union and the
conduct of competing business enterprises by "collaboration" 2C9
within each establishment are also contenders for recognition,
and the communist unions, organized upon a still different basis,
are increasing in strength.16' Yet a legally prescribed form of
organization would have to be based upon a choice of institutions.
The other problem has to do with the conduct of whatever type
of organization is selected. Procedure is of central importance
in preventing usurpation of authority, graft, and oppression. It
has been recognized, even by advocates of compulsory control by
collective agreement, that it would be fatal to found it upon associations whose internal functioning is surrounded by no guaranAct of 1919 was under discussion. LAu'TAUD, LES C0.N'VNTIONS COLLECTIVES
DE TRAVAIL (1924) 109-118.
58
BRETHE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 146.
159Id. at 84, 186-187.
160Id. at 71-2; Tardy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 436-7.
161 Communist theory advocates the industrial or commercial establishment as the unit of workers' organization, with local and regional associations of plant committees. The C. G. T. U. is reorganizing along these lines.
CLARK, op. cit. suprea note 11, at 123-126. The ultimate purpose, of course,

is not collective bargaining but complete control of production by the
workers.
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ties against abuse.1- Neither problem, however, is incapable of
solution, and there is no alternative if chaos in employment relations is to be supplanted by orderly control on a democratic basis.
In any event it seems clear that the tendency of French development is toward an increasing use of collective labor agreements. Barring a revolution, the political state will be called
upon to recognize or devise a system of control of employment
relations which is adequate to modern needs and in conformity
with social ideals. The courts will, as heretofore, chart and direct
the mechanics of the system in its details, if not apply the ultimate forces which cause it to operate.
162 Duguit, op. cit. supra note 67, at 415; rep. to Chamber of Deputies,
supra,note 82, at 450. See also Morel, Les conventions collectives do travail
et la loi du 25 mars 1919 (1919) 18 REV. TRIIM
ISTRIELLE DE DR0IT CIVIL 421.
Al. Colson, who played a prominent part in preliminary studies which led
to the COLLECTIV AGREEMENT ACT of 1919, has recently pointed out that
the unstable and divided character of French unionism makes it an unsatisfactory basis for responsible industrial control. See his R6le des syndicats
dan les conventions et les conflits collectives de travail (1929) 139 REV. rom.
ET PnARx.18. Facts to support this view are gathered together in Tardy, op.
cit. supra note 18.

